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Abstract 
The work presented is part of the Dutch THRIVE project which centers on dynamic 
simulation of joint roll-out of a hydrogen refuelling infrastructure and a hydrogen vehicle fleet. 
The simulation tool enables modelling of fuel supplier and car manufacturer strategies, and 
consumer attitude towards hydrogen. A car cost model is used in the THRIVE project for the 
post-processing of roll-out simulation results to determine type and level of possible policy 
support necessary that make FCEVs cost-competitive. 
1 Introduction 
The Dutch THRIVE project addresses the use of hydrogen as a fuel for passenger cars in the 
Netherlands during the commercialisation phase. Its objective thereby is the identification of 
plausible rollout scenarios for both a hydrogen refuelling infrastructure as well as for a 
hydrogen car fleet. Attention was paid to the preferences of the motorists and the influence of 
the availability and visibility of both hydrogen cars as hydrogen refuelling opportunities. The 
methodology applied in the THRIVE project consists mainly of two steps. The first step 
consist of running model-simulations that generate plausible roll out scenarios for both 
hydrogen cars and an hydrogen infrastructure, under the assumption of level playing field 
conditions. The input data is bounded by coherent sets of assumptions around different 
levels of policy ambition regarding the stimulation of hydrogen fuelled auto mobility. During 
the second step, the output of the model-simulations is analysed in terms of quantitative 
market development, well-to-wheel efficiency and emissions and effects of policy measures. 
In this report, particular focus is on the analysis of the consequences of the level playing field 
assumption in terms of required policy support for vehicle retail prices.  
2 Cost Gap Analysis 
The objective of the cost gap analysis is to come to sound estimations on the amount of 
investment that is required to ensure the level playing fields condition. We applied the 
learning curve methodology which describes the fuel cell car costs as a function of the 
cumulative number of produced of fuel cell vehicles. 
2.1 Methodology: scaling 
The roll out simulations realised in the THRIVE project generate, among others, fuel cell car 
sales numbers in the Netherlands. Sales numbers can be translated to cumulative production 
numbers. Yet, the cumulative production numbers required for estimating fuel cell car cost 
developments should be global and not national. To estimate global cumulative production 
numbers, a straightforward multiplication factor of 100 has been determined which indicates 
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the scale of the Dutch car-fleet compared to the global car-fleet. History has shown that the 
introduction of new drive-train technology doesn’t necessarily pick up at the constant same 
rate in the Netherlands as it may do in the rest of the world: after 10 years, the penetration of 
the ICE-hybrid in the Dutch car-fleet accelerated to a rate double to that of the global 
average. The general interpretation of this shift of rates is explained here by the fact that the 
Netherlands are generally progressive when it comes to cleaner energy technologies, yet 
since they do not have their own car-industry, it takes a while before the trend gains 
momentum. It is assumed this mechanism holds for FCEVs too. The global cumulative 
production numbers as derived from the simulated penetration of hydrogen vehicles in the 
Dutch national car fleet, for the three scenarios low, medium and high, are given in figure 1. 
Also the global cumulative production curve as it was estimated by the European HyWays 
project is plotted in the same graph. 
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Figure 1: Global cumulative hydrogen car production numbers as derived form the THRIVE 
simulation results. The "high" scenario does not deviate very much from the 
HyWays estimations. The arrows with the ratio’s indicate the interval in time over 
which a certain ratio is assumed. 
 
2.2 Methodology: learning curve methodology 
To estimate the future price development of hydrogen cars, a learning curve approach is 
applied which describes the relation between cost price and total cumulative number of units 
produced: 
I(C) = I0 * (C/C0) -(ln(pr)/ln(2)) 
With I = cost price fuel cell vehicle, C = cumulative number of vehicles produced,  
I0 = cost price fuel cell vehicle at t = 0, C0 = cumulative number of vehicles produced at t = 0,  
Pr = progress ratio. 
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We assume here that the cost price of hydrogen vehicles equals the cost price of 
conventional ICE vehicles minus the costs of an ICE drive-train plus the costs of a fuel cell 
drive-train. The drive-train consists of a fuel cell system, a hydrogen storage tank, an 
electromotor and a battery-pack. These three subparts differ in technological maturity. 
Furthermore it is assumed that learning will flatten out at a bottom cost price after 1 million 
vehicles produced. The values of the progress ratio for each of the subparts are given in 
table 1. Progress ratio pr is here assumed to represent the lumped sum of learning by doing, 
learning by searching and economy of scale. [1]. 
Table 1: Progress ratios, initial costs and production numbers for the subparts of a fuel cell 
drive-train system [2,3,4]. 
C0 = 2000 (in 2013) 80 kW FC system H2 tank E-motor Battery 
I0 (€) 28 000 7 000 4 000 2 750 
pr 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.90 
pr after 1 mln cars 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.95 
2.3 Methodology: reference car 
The ICE hybrid is chosen as the benchmark for the FCEV in terms of cost price. In contrast 
to the fuel cell drive train, the ICE drive train will increase in price as a result of technological 
changes that are required to meet emission legislations, reaching it’s maximum increase at 
around 2800,-euro [5]. The forecasted development of the cost-price of both the ICE hybrid 
drivetrain as well as the FC drivetrain is plotted in figure 3. 
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Figure 2: The expected cost price development of an 80kW fuel cell vehicle compared to that 
of the reference car, an 80kW ICE hybrid. 
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The difference between the costprice of the FCEV and the ICE hybrid in year X is the basis 
for calculating the cost gap in year X. The total cost-gap of a future transition equals the 
summation of all the annual cost-gaps over the whole transition-period 2015-2050. 
3 Calculations  
The annual cost-gap is calculated for the three scenario’s based on low, medium and high 
policy ambition. The result is shown in figure 3. To get a feeling for when the FCEV cost-
price is within a close range of the cost-price of the ICE hybrid, the orange crosses in figure 4 
indicate when in time the FCEV costs still only 10% more than the ICE hybrid. 
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Figure 3: The annual cost-gap for the three different scenario's based on low, medium and 
high policy ambition. 
 
4 Discussion 
4.1 The order of magnitude of the cost-gap 
The analysis performed in this study gives an indication of the range of investment required 
to bridge the cost-gap between FCEV’s and reference cars, ICE-hybrids. Yet in order to get a 
feeling for the relative size of the total investment, the yearly cost-gap has been divided over 
the sales of non fuel cell vehicles. For the three scenarios built on low, medium and high 
policy level, the resulting costs per non-FCEV sold are plotted in figure 4. The figure reveals 
that the amount of required investment in the Dutch car-market, would translate to about 75 
to 160 euro per non-FCEV car.  
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Figure 4: The annual cost gap divided by the total amount of non-FCEV's per year. 
 
4.2 The influence of cost-reduction rates induced by different progress ratios 
So far, little attention has been payed to the influence of the chosen progress ratios Pr. 
History has shown that for new technologies, progress ratios of 0.8 are rather typical and 
achievable. Yet the progress ratio Pr cannot be predicted, as it is an empirical methodology; 
the value for Pr can “officially” only be established in hindsight. Yet, an alternative approach 
is to establish a value for Pr that should be achieved, in order to keep a market situation 
which is competitive for FCEV’s. In other words, if a Pr value is monitored real-time and it 
shows a deviation of the target Pf that was established as the necessary value, this can be 
interpreted as an indicator for the viability of FCEV’s on the market. Figure 5 presents plots 
for different combinations of values of the progress ratio Pr. As was mentioned earlier, it is 
logical to assume that the Pr values will not be constant over time but will show flattening 
over time. In our calculations, we introduced two transition points in time on which the 
progress ratio changes: after 1 million and after 20 million cars globally produced. 
4.2.1 Case I 
In case I, the optimal ‘default’ case is analysed, this is the case that follows the Pr values for 
the different parts such as is given in table 1. This also translates to only 1 Pr transition after 
1 mln cars and no further transition after 20 mln cars. The annual additional costs of FCEV’s 
for the default case is one of the three curves displayed in figure 5. The figure shows that for 
the default case, the annual additional costs do not exceed the 100 M€ and are reduced to 0 
€/year around the year 2043.  
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4.2.2 Case II 
To analyse the influence of the progress ratio Pr on the annual additional costs, the value for 
Pr has been varied. The first variation on the default case is based on an increased value of 
Pr for only the fuel cell system during the first million cars. The input looks as given in 
table 2. 
Table 2: Input for the case II scenario: Pr > 0.8 during the first million FCEV's produce. 
Deviations from the default case are printed in bold. 
Progress Ratios Fuel Cell H2 tank E-motor Battery 
Phase I 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Phase II  > 1mln cars 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.95 
 
In figure 5, the Case II scenario is represented by the graph named “Reduced FC cost 
decrease”. The sensitivity of the annual additional costs for the progress ratio Pr is made 
clear once the default case (Case I) and the “reduced FC cost decrease” (Case II) are 
compared. Case II leads to maximum annual additional costs of around 350 M€, whereas the 
maximum annual additional costs in the default case do not exceed  100 M€. Furthermore, 
whereas the annual additional costs have decreased to 0€ around the year 2043 in the 
default case, the annual additional costs in Case II are in decline after the year 2043 but still 
around 300 M€ in 2050. This difference is significant and already indicates the need for 
continuous R&D efforts to keep the progress ratio Pr at a minimum of 0.8 and preferably 
lower. 
4.2.3 Case III 
The third case considered, is the case which is identical to Case I up to 20 million cars. After 
20 million cars however, there is a transition to higher values for the progress ratio Pr for not 
just the fuel cell system, but also the hydrogen tank, the electromotor and the battery pack. 
The input for case III is as given in table 3. 
Table 3: Input for the case III scenario. After 20 million cars, the following values are 
introduced: Pr(fuel cell system) = 0.95, Pr(H2 tank) = 0.98, Pr(e-motor) = 0.98, 
Pr(battery) = 0.98. Deviations from the default case are printed in bold. 
Progress Ratios Fuel Cell H2 tank E-motor Battery 
Phase I 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Phase II  > 1mln cars 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Phase III >20mln cars 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 
 
In figure 5, Case III is represented by the curve “Further decrease rate of cost reduction > 20 
mln”. The annual additional costs in Case III do not exceed 175 M€, which is half the 
maximum annual additional costs of Case II. Yet, Case III like Case II shows a much longer 
period of annual additional costs than the default case, Case I. From the comparison of 
Cases I, II and III it can be concluded that the influence of the progress ratio Pr is much more 
significant in the initial stages (< 1 million cars) than in later stages. Furthermore, figure 5 
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indicates that in order to keep the time-interval in which annual additional costs are a reality 
short, it is recommended to especially keep the progress ratio Pr for the fuel cell system at 
around 0.8 or lower. This can only be achieved by continuous and sustaining R&D efforts.   
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Figure 5: The annual additional costs for Case I, II and III. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This study intended to create insight in the mechanisms which shape the market for 
hydrogen vehicles in the Netherlands.  
Calculations on the basis of estimations for input data showed that the implementation of 
FCEV’s seems feasible. Plausible scenarios indicate annual additional costs of maximally 40 
– 80 M€ which would translate to an order of magnitude of 160€ per non-FCEV sold on the 
Dutch car market.   
In order to achieve these ‘low’ annual costs however, strong R&D efforts remain required in 
order to further decrease fuel cell system costs.  
It is not the intention of this study to give accurate predictions of cost developments. There 
are many parameters involved, and the development of these parameters in time are 
uncertain: thus, uncertainty accumulates easily in the calculations. Slight perturbations in the 
progress rates have large consequences for long term cost developments. However, reverse 
reasoning allows us to explain which conditions minimally need to be fulfilled in order to 
make fuel cell vehicles competitive. If these conditions were to be absurd, this would lead to 
the conclusion that fuel cell vehicles will not be able to compete decently with mainstream 
alternatives. 
Furthermore, there are antagonist forces when it comes to the introduction of FCEV’s in the 
Netherlands. The Dutch car market is about 1/100 x the size of the global car-market. The 
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influence that the Dutch market can have on the globally induced fuel cell system cost 
reduction is tiny and insignificant. From that perspective, the Netherlands have an interest to 
be a follower, rather than an early adopter. Yet because of the integration of the European 
market and road-network, the Netherlands do have an interest to keep up with for example 
neighbouring country Germany. 
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